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Summary findings
A recent but rapidly growing empirical literature focuses  Using data from India, Serven examines this issue
on the relationship between public and private capital.  empirically by implementing a simple analytical model
But for the most part,  it ignores the heterogeneity of  encompassing two types of public capital.  The empirical
public investment.  results show that in the long run capital for public
In many countries, especially in the developing world,  infrastructure projects crowds in private capital - other
public investment includes not only basic infrastructure  types of public capital have the opposite effect. But in the
projects but also commercial and industrial projects  short run, both kinds of public investment may crowd
similar to those undertaken  by the private sector. And  out private investment.
those two types of public investment are likely to have
quite different effects on the accumulation of private
capital.
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The relationship between public and private investment, a long-standing issue in macroeconomics
and development economics, has attracted renewed attention in recent years. Two factors have been
behind this re-examination. On the one hand, the worldwide shift of the 1980s towards a growth strategy
underscoring market forces and private sector leadership -- whose major exponent was the collapse of
centrally-planned economies -- led in many countries to a retrenchment of the public sector from
production and to a redefinition of its role in the development process, under the guiding principle that
the public sector should concentrate its resources in areas where it supports, rather than replacing, the
activity of the private sector.
In the academic arena, on the other hand, the macroeconomic role of public investment was brought
to center stage by Aschauer (1989a, b), who analyzed empirically the impact of public capital
accumulation on US private investment and output, and found a sizable positive effect in both cases.
Aschauer's  wcArk  has been followed by a rapidly growing literature re-examining his results -- which
remain controversial -- from both micro and macroeconomic perspectives (see Gramlich 1994 for
extensive references) and extending his analysis to other countries (e.g., Berndt and Hansson 1992,
Argimon et. al. 1995).
For the most part, however, this literature has focused on aggregate public investment, ignoring the
important question of public investment heterogeneity.'  Empirically, this approach may be adequate for
some industrial countries (with the US as a leading example), where the public sector's  involvement in
conventional industrial and commercial activities is almost negligible. However, this is not the general
case among developed economies (France or Italy would provide clear counter-examples), and much less
so in developing countries. In the latter the state is frequently involved, through public enterprises, in
multiple activities such as manufacturing, banking, commerce, and so on, in addition to its more
conventional role as provider of public goods and infrastructure services. This heterogeneity of public
capital implies that different types of public investment likely have opposing effects on private sector
activity: public projects in areas such as basic infrastructure and human capital formation presumably
tend to raise the profitability of private production and thereby encourage private investment, while
public projects in more conventional activities -- where public enterprises basically replicate the actions
of private firms -- might be expected to have the opposite effect, by competing with the private sector in
I A notable  exception  is the work  by Easterly  and Rebelo  (1993),  who investigate  the impact  of different  types of
public  investment  (as well as consumption)  on private  investment  and growth in a cross-section  of developing
countries.2
goods and factor markets.2 In such conditions, attempts to identify a meaningful relationship between
aggregate public and private capital are doomed to failure.
Another methodological pitfall plaguing most empirical studies of the macroeconomic impact of
public investment is their failure to deal adequately with the non-stationarity of the variables of interest.
In this vein, the large impact of public capital on real GDP found by some empirical studies using
aggregate US data has been criticized as a spurious result that vanishes when the variables are expressed
in first differences (Hulten and Schwab 1991). However, first-differencing is certainly not a solution,
because it removes the long-run relationships that may be present in the data and that are precisely the
main question at issue (Munnell, 1992).
This paper examines empirically the relationship between public and private investment in India.
The  heterogeneity of public capital is clearly visible in India, whose experience of the last four decades
provides an extreme example of overexpansion of the public sector. In the context of a state-led, inward-
oriented development strategy that lasted until the early  1990s, Indian public enterprises extended into
virtually all sectors of the economy. Moreover, they were instrumental in generating increasingly large
public deficits in the 1980s, which brought the country to the verge of a foreign exchange crisis in
1990/91 and eventually led to a radical reorientation of economic policy and the abandonment of the
state-led growth model. From the policy viewpoint, the need for a substantial retrenchment of the public
sector in India has underscored the importance of redefining public investment priorities in favor of those
activities supportive of rapid private sector expansion.
Against this background, the paper revisits empirically the impact of public capital on private capital.
The focus of the analysis is on the effects of the former on the profitability of the latter. This is the
dimension that allows a meaningful distinction between public projects competitive, and complementary,
with those of the private sector. The paper develops a simple analytical model embodying this
distinction, and implements it using disaggregate public investment data for India. To avoid the
methodological pitfalls of previous studies using aggregate time-series data, the empirical application
follows a cointegration approach. In particular, because the available empirical sample is small, no
attempt is made to model each of the different factors affecting the optimal private capital stock; instead,
the analysis is based on a simpler conditional model, drawing from some recent results in the analysis of
cointegrated systems. The consequences of this modeling strategy for the validity of the resulting
parameter estimates are thoroughly explored.
2 Even for the U.S., Aschauer  (I 989a) finds  that 'core' infrastructure,  comprising  roads,  water and sewage,  is the
type of public investment  with  strongest  positive  impact  on private  output.3
The paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  2 provides  a brief background  to public  and private
investment  in India.  Section 3 outlines  a simple  model of private  and public capital.  Section  4 presents
the econometric  implementation  of the model  to India. Finally,  Section  5 concludes.
2 - Public and private investment in India: background
Like many other developing countries, in the late 1950s India embarked on a state-led, inward-
oriented development strategy, which underwent only minor variations until the early 1990s. Its key
ingredient was rapid industrialization centered on heavy, capital-intensive industries, under the guidance
of central planning and the leadership of the public sector, in a general framework of national self-
sufficiency. 3
For over three decades,  private investors  had to face the complex  regulatory  system  that was erected
to pursue  this strategy.  It involved  comprehensive  licensing  of firms' entry, expansion  and diversification
plans; reservation of entire productive sectors for the state; high barriers to foreign trade protecting
domestic production from external competition; and mandatory credit allocation schemes imposed on the
banking system. This was accompanied by the expansion of the public sector into most spheres of
economic activity, encompassing not only those explicitly reserved to the state (which included basic
infrastructure sectors such as telecommunications and power), but also industrial and commercial
activities in which public firmns  competed with private firms.
This growth strategy was reflected in a steady increase in investment/GDP ratios, which measured at
constant prices rose from under 16 percent in the early 1960s to over 20 percent in the late 1980s and
early 1990s (Table 1). At current prices the increase was even more pronounced -- nominal investment
rose from 13 to 22 percent of nominal GDP over the same period --, due to the steady rise in the relative
price of investment (measured by the investment deflator relative to the GDP deflator). To a large extent,
this relative price trend mirrored the gradual strengthening of barriers to capital goods imports that, along
with the banning of most consumer imports, was a centerpiece of India's  inward-looking policies. 4
3 See Dubey (1994)  for an overview  of India's  development  strategy  since  independence.
4 Tariff  collection  on machinery  and equipment  imports  rose steadily  from around  6 percent of import  value in  the
early 1960s  to over 80 percent in the late 1980s;  this was undoubtedly  a major  factor  behind  the steady  increase  in
the relative  price of equipment  in India,  which,  according  to cross-country  evidence  reported  by DeLong  and
Summers  (1993),  was among  the highest  in the world during  the 1980s.4
The active role of the public sector was duly reflected in the large volume of public investment,
which since the early 1960s had reached proportions similar to those of private investment, due primarily
to the strong investment effort of public enterprises (Table 1). The latter gained momentum in the 1980s,
during which the public investment/GDP ratio reached its peak at 9.5 percent. In that decade, the public
enterprise sector became India's  major investor, a role that had traditionally belonged to the informal
private sector (households and unincorporated businesses).
These trends, however, were partially reversed after the fiscal crisis of 1990/91 and the ensuing
reforms, which led to a retrenchment of public investment and a parallel expansion of private capital
accumulation, due in appearance to booming private corporate investment. However, it should be noted
that the breakdown of private investment data between the incorporated and unincorporated sectors is not
entirely reliable (see Little and Joshi 1994, Ch. 13). The reason is that investment by the unincorporated
sector is derived as a residual, so any over- (under-) estimation of private corporate investment is
correspondingly reflected in under- (over-) estimation of investment by the informal sector. Indeed, the
investment/GDP ratios of the two subsectors display a strong negative correlation (equal to -.74) in the
period 1960/61-1994/95, for which there is no clear economic justification.5
As Table 2 shows, the massive investment effort of the public sector over the last three decades had a
very heterogeneous nature. Part of it took the form of  basic infrastructure capital in areas such as
agricultural irrigation, transport, telecommunications and power. Another significant fraction
corresponded to standard public sector activities such as public administration and defense. However, a
rather substantial portion of total public investment was consistently devoted to industrial and
commercial activities, notably in manufacturing, which in market economies are usually undertaken by
the private sector (cf. the row labeled "other" in Table 2). In addition, this latter fraction of  public
investment expenditures showed an increasing trend until the late 1980s, rising from under 30 percent of
total public investment in the 1960s to close to 40 percent in the second half of the 1980s.
The fact that vast public resources were employed in non-infrastructure projects certainly does not
mean that India's  infrastructure needs were satisfied. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence that
inadequate roads and telecommunication networks and poor electricity supply continued to pose major
obstacles to economic activity. 6 Indeed, the cross-country data presented in Table 3 clearly suggest that
5 The rates of growth of the corresponding  sectoral  capital  stocks  show  a similarly  negative  correlation.  The
reliability  of disaggregated  private  investment  figures  has recently  been subject  of controversy  in India, as some
observers  have argued  that  the measured  decline  in household  investment  rates since 1990  is just a statistical  artifact,
likely  due to the overestimation  of private  corporate  investment.  See Balakrishnan  (1996) for further  discussion.
6  See World  Bank (1993).5
during the 1980s  India's infrastructure  investment  effort did not keep pace with that of other LDCs  -- not
even  those in the lower-income  segment  of the developing  world.
It seems likely  that India's heterogeneous  public investment  mix had opposing  effects on private
sector  activity.  Public investment  in infrastructure  sectors  reserved  to the state presumably  contributed  to
raise the profitability  of private production  and had, ceteris  paribus, a crowding-in  effect on private
investment. 7 By contrast,  public investment  in industrial  and commercial  sectors  open to competition
between  private and public  firms might  have had the opposite  effect:  by competing  with private firms for
productive  inputs and output markets  (and investment  licenses),  the expansion  of public  capital may have
crowded-out  private investment.  In any case, the important  conclusion  is that, to investigate  the
relationship  between  private  and public investment  in India,  the heterogeneity  of the latter  needs to be
taken into consideration  -- an aspect  often ignored  in the empirical literature  on the relationship  between
public  and private investment.  The next section outlines  a framework  to address  this issue.
3 - Public capital and the profitabilit  of private capital: a simple model
A simple model encompassing private capital along with heterogeneous public capital can be
sketched along the following lines. Assume that the supply side of the economy consists of the public
and the private sectors. The public sector produces two goods. The first one is an intermediate productive
input used by private firms called 'infrastructure services'; for simplicity, assume further that such
services are produced using only infrastructure capital (such as roads and public works), and that they are
supplied free of charge to users. 8 The other good supplied by the public sector is a final good produced
by non-infrastructure public enterprises using capital and labor. Finally, the private sector produces
another final good using capital, labor and infrastructure services. The two final goods are imperfect
substitutes in private consumption; thus, the degree of substitutability between them provides a measure
of the extent to which non-infrastructure public enterprises compete with private firms in output markets.
7 In fact, this might  apply as well  to some public  investments  in  manufacturing,  to the extent  that import  restrictions
and legal state  monopolies  made  the public  sector  the sole  supplier  of some basic  intermediate  inputs  (Joshi  and
Little, 1994,  Chapter 13).
8 Thus,  the implicit  assumption  is that infrastructure  services  are financed  via (lump-sum)  taxes.  This is the same
approach  adopted  by Aschauer  (1989a).6
For simplicity, assume also that private and public capital accumulation make use only of privately and
publicly-produced goods, respectively. 9
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived representative agent who consumes the two final
goods, owns the private firms, and supplies inelastically her entire labor endowment, which for
notational simplicity will be set equal to 1; however, at each instant the private agent has to decide how
to allocate her labor between private and public firmns.  The agent's objective is to maximize the utility
functional
.r  U(C 
ler  \pr  'g  ds  (1)
where the subscriptspr  and g respectively denote private consumption of the privately and publicly
produced final goods, r is the discount rate, the parameter 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, and for convenience it will be assumed that the instantaneous utility function
U is homogeneous of degree one in its two arguments and displays a constant elasticity of (intra-
temporal) substitution  c.
Maximization of (1) is subject to the constraints
Y+ wLg =Cpr  + pgCg  + Kpr+  T  (2a)
Y = H(Z)  L  K,  (2b)
Lpr +Lg=I  (2c)
Here Y  denotes real output of the privately-produced final good; w and pg respectively are the real wage
and the relative price of the publicly-produced final good, both in terms of the private good; Tare lump-
sum (net) taxes, which can be positive or negative; Z denotes infrastructure capital, and Lj is the agent's
labor supplied to  sectorj.  Equation (2a) is the agent's budget constraint, where capital stock depreciation
9 Alternatively,  we could assume  that  capital  goods are a combination  of private  and public  final  goods. This  would
add some algebra  without  affecting  the results.7
has been ignored. In turn, (2b) describes the technology used in the production of the private good,
which is assumed to display constant returns to scale over capital and labor. 1I
In addition to (2a)-(2c), the first-order conditions for an interior solution to this problem can be
shown to include
U(Cpr ,Cg)  au  X  (3a) acpr
U(Cpr  Cg)  =XPg  (3b) acg
L  pr 
ik =[r-H(Z)(1-ax)\  Kpr )](3c)
Kpr  I___  I  3c
H(Z)a  W  (3d)
Equations (3a) and (3b) characterize optimal consumption. The variable X represents the marginal utility
of wealth, and its time path is given by (3c). Finally, (3d) is the familiar marginal productivity condition
determining employment in the private sector.
In turn, the public sector produces infrastructure services, using only capital, and a final good, using
both capital and labor. Letting G denote output of the final good, the public-sector budget constraint is
T + pg (G - Kg - Z)  =  WLg  (4)
where the term in brackets represents the net supply of the final good produced by the public sector. Its
production technology is:
10 In Meade's (1957)  terminology,  this corresponds  to the "atmospheric"  characterization  of public  infrastructure
services.  Altematively,  constant  retums overK, L and  Z in private  production  would  correspond  to his "unpaid
factor"  model.8
G= L  Kg(5)
The  trajectories  of the infrastructure  and non-infrastructure  public capital stocks  are assumed
exogenous.  Given  the latter, public  non-infrastructure  firms determine  their employment  levels from
standard  profit  maximization:
( Lg)  pg  (6) ~'LgJ  Pg
Finally,  the model is completed  with the private-goods  market-clearing  conditionl :
Y= Cr  +  K,  (7)
Equations  (2)-(7) fully characterize  equilibrium  in the two-sector  model. Given the trajectories  of the
public  sector's infrastructure  and non-infrastructure  capital stocks,  they determine  the real wage and the
allocation  of labor  between  private  and public firms, the levels of output  and private consumption  of the
two final goods  as well as their relative  price,  total taxes, and the trajectory  of the private capital  stock.
Long-run impact of changes in the public capital stocks
The model's steady  state is characterized  by constant  stocks of the three kinds of capital and a
constant  k. Thus,  output of the two final goods  is fully devoted  to private consumption  and, from (3c)
above,  the marginal  product  of private capital  equals  the real interest  rate. This in turn ties down  the
private sector's long-run  capital/output  ratio.
The effects  of changes  in public capital  on the model's steady  state are easily found.  Consider  first
the case of an increase  in the non-infrastructure  capital  stock Kg,.  Public  firms' output  G expands
unambiguously,  and its relative  price  pg falls. What  happens  to private firms' output  and capital stock ?
Given  the stock of infrastructure  capital,  private firmns'  capital/labor  ratio, and hence  the real wage in
terms  of private goods,  are uniquely  determined  by the given  real interest  rate (from (3c) above).  Hence,
I I Walras' law ensures  that when  both budget  constraints  hold  and the private  goods  market  clears,  the market  for
the final good  produced  by public  firms clears  as well.9
private output,  capital  and employment  must all move in the same  direction:  they must rise if public
employment  declines  (thus freeing  up labor for private firms), and fall in the opposite  case. In turn, the
change in public sector  employment  depends  on two mutually  opposing  forces:  on the one hand, the
decline in pg shifts final demand  away from private firms' final good,  and this tends to raise employment
in the public  sector,  more so the larger  the degree of substitutability  in consumption  between  the two
final goods.  On the other hand, the decline  inp, raises the real wage in terms of public firms' output
(recall  that the real wage in terms of private goods  does not change),  which tends to lower public
employment.  The net result  therefore depends  on whether  substitution  on the demand  side between  the
two final goods  dominates  substitution  against labor in public  firms' production.
Analytically,  replacing  (2a), (3c), (4) and (7) with their respective  stationary  version,  some
straightforward  manipulations  yield  the following  implicit  equation for the long-run  private capital stock:
a H(Z)'[1  a  ]I<'(  -K  K(OC-tX1-)  K  K  (8)
13  L  - (~~~~~~~~~H(Z){1  -a)J  Jr
Differentiating  this expression  yields:
dKp,  =Kpr  (I1- cc)(I  - )Lg
dKg  Kg  Lg + Lpr  [  +a  c (1I-)]
Thus, an increase  in the non-infrastructure  public capital  stock raises (reduces)  the long-run  private
capital stock and output  if the elasticity  of substitution  in consumption  between  the two final goods is
smaller (larger)  than one.
Consider  now the long-run  consequences  of an increase  in the stock  of infrastructure  capital  Z. This
raises the productivity  of capital and labor in the private sector;  therefore,  private firms' output  must
unambiguously  expand,  and its relative  price falls (equivalently,  pg rises). Since private  firms'
capital/output  ratio is given,  the private capital  stock expands  along  with output.  From (3c) it is apparent
that private firms' capital/labor  ratio must rise, and therefore  the real wage has to go up.10
What happens to public firms'  output ? Analogously with the previous experiment, the answer
depends on whether long-run private employment rises or falls. As before, there are two forces at work:
the rise in pg, that shifts consumption demand towards the private sector, and the real wage increase, that
tends to displace labor towards the public sector. Analytically, from (8) one gets:
dKpr  KpH' (Z)  3Lpr  +sc  (1--  PLpr)
> 0  (10a)
dZ  aH(Z)  Lg + Lpr[P +  c(1C  - )]
dG  = GH'(Z)  1(1-crc  )Lpr  (10b)
dZ  aH(Z)  Lg + Lpr [  +f  (1-C,  )  (
Hence, symmetrically with (9), equation (lOb) shows that an increase in the infrastructure public capital
stock raises (reduces) public firms' output and employment if the elasticity of substitution in
consumption between the two final goods is smaller (larger) than one.
In summary, this simple framework draws a sharp distinction between the public sector's
infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital. An increase in public infrastructure capital raises the
profitability of private production and thereby the long-run private capital stock. By contrast, an increase
in non-infrastructure capital may raise or lower the private capital stock, depending on how close
substitutes are the final goods supplied by the public and private sectors. The higher the degree of
substitutability, the more likely that an expansion in public non-infrastructure capital will result in
crowding-out of the private sector. It should be stressed that this kind of crowding-out is entirely due to
the fact that the public and private sectors engage in similar productive activities, and is therefore
completely unrelated to the conventional 'financial crowding-out' that extensively explored in the
macroeconomic literature.12
12 Indeed,  by assuming  that the discount  rater is given,  the model  in the text rules out financial  crowding  out. In
terms of the model,  financial  crowding  out would  arise if the public  sector  were allowed  to finance  its activities
through  debt issue,  and the real discount  rate  were positively  related  to the outstanding  public  debt stock.  However,
this type of crowding-out  would  be a consequence  of the public  sector's overall  deficit  and financing  strategy,  rather
than of public  investment  itself,  which is the main focus  here.II
4 - Empirical implementation
4.1 Preliminary issues
In order to implement empirically to India the model just described, it is necessary to amend it in two
ways.  First, the model makes no distinction between the prices of capital goods and final goods. In
reality, however, the relative price of investment goods has experienced large swings in India, due
anong  other factors to the substantial changes in trade barriers to capital goods imports over the last two
decades, to which reference was made earlier.1 3
More problematic is the question of finding an empirical counterpart for the real interest rate r. This
is not only due to the fact that interest rates have remained tightly controlled in India over the last three
decades but, more importantly, to the above-illustrated fact that the bulk of private investment is made
by the informal sector, which lacks access to most financial markets. The main exception is credit
supplied by banks under mandatory credit allocation rules (such as the so-called "Small Scale Industries"
scheme) that reserve a prescribed fraction of overall bank credit for unincorporated businesses and
independent operators at highly subsidized (and officially-determined) interest rates. This makes the
observed interest rate a very poor indicator of the cost of financing to the informal sector. Thus, a better
alternative is to measure it by the availability of financing, which, given the functioning of the subsidized
credit schemes, can be proxied by the real stock of bank credit to the private sector.
With these modifications, an empirically suitable version of equation (8) may be written:
kip =(p (kg,Z,pk  crpr)  (11)
(?)  (+)  (-  (+
wherepk is the relative price of capital goods (measured by the deflator of private investment relative to
privately-produced GDP), crp, is the real stock of credit to the private sector, lowercase letters denote the
13 It would  be straightforward  to introduce  in  the model  of the previous  section  the distinction  between  capital  goods
and final goods  prices,  with an exogenous  tax driving  a wedge  between  them.  Assume,  for example,  that a tax at rate
T is levied  on capital  goods purchases,  and letpk  1  1+ T. It is straightforward  to verify that, in the equation
characterizing  the long-run  private  capital  stock (8),  r would  simply  be replaced  with  rpk.  An increase  in the tax rate,
and hence  in  Pk,  given the infrastructure  stock z, would  unambiguously  reduce the long-run  private  capital stock.12
natural logarithm of the corresponding variables, and the sign under each variable indicates the expected
direction of its impact on the private capital stock.14
The available sample comprises annual data from 1960/61 to 1993/9415  . The core of the data are the
private and public real fixed capital stocks series, with the latter suitably disaggregated to permit
implementation of the model outlined in the preceding section. The Appendix provides more details on
their construction.
The empirical analysis below uses a narrow definition of public infrastructure investment, which
includes power, water and sewage, and transport and communications. However, empirical experiments
using narrower (excluding power and water) and broader (including public agriculture investment, whose
major components are irrigation works and rural roads) aggregates led to similar qualitative results.
To find out if a long-run relationship such as ( 11)  above exists, and estimate its parameters, the
analysis below makes use of some recent developments in the econometrics of cointegrated time series.
In this regard, an important methodological issue is the choice of modeling and estimation technique. In
principle, the approach best suited for the purpose at hand would be Johansen's  (1988) full-information
procedure, which is asymptotically efficient. In the case at hand,  it would involve the estimation of a
fifth-order vector-autoregressive (VAR) error-correction model with kpr,,  kg  z, crpr and pk as
dependent variables. There are practical problems with this approach, however, especially in a small-
sample context like the present one. On the one hand, parameter estimation and hypothesis testing in the
framework of a five-equation system would be severely hampered by the limited degrees of freedom
available (see e.g. Heargraves 1994). On the other, modeling and economic interpretation of the
empirical relations in a large system is often problematic, since economic theory may not offer sufficient
guidance for a 'complete'  structural specification (Urbain,  1995). Further, a VAR is essentially a
statistical model of the reduced form; if one is interested not only in the long-run parameters, but also in
the short-run dynamics, the reduced-form parameters are of limited structural (and economic) interest.
For these reasons, the strategy adopted below relies on the specification and estimation of a
conditional model, along the lines described by Johansen (1992) and Boswijk (1994, 1995). The strategy
proceeds in three stages. First, likelihood ratio tests are used to determine the number of cointegrating
relations in the full system. Next, a partial structural model is specified and estimated; as argued by
14 Notice  that (direct)  taxation is being ignored  in (I l). This  is consistent  with the fact  that most investment  is done
by the informal  private  sector,  which is not subject  to corporate  taxation and  can be presumed  to largely  escape  most
other  forms  of direct  taxation.
15  The observations  correspond  to the Indian  fiscal  year,  which runs  from April  to March.13
Boswijk (1995), the choice of endogenous variables in the model should be guided by the outcome of the
cointegration tests. Because estimation of the partial system is conditional on the variables left outside it,
the third stage involves testing their (weak) exogeneity, to verify if the partial model's  estimates carry
over to the full system.
4.2 Integration and cointegration
A preliminary step is to explore the time-series properties of the variables in ( 11).  Table 4 reports the
results of tests of stationarity of each of the variables. The top half of the table reports augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics. Since capital stocks should be expected to display considerable
inertia, the tests were performed adding three lags of the dependent variable to the ADF regression. As
can be seen from the top row of Table 4, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for any of
the series. In turn, the second row reports the statistics testing the null hypothesis that the series are 1(2) -
- in other words, the first differences of the original series still contain unit roots. The null can be rejected
at the 5 percent level for all series except the private capital stock, for which the test statistic is
significant only at the 1O  percent level.
As a double check on the above results, the bottom half of Table 4 reports the results of the
stationarity test proposed by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin, whose null hypothesis is that the series
do not possess unit roots -- i.e., the opposite to the null under the ADF test; like in the previous case, the
test statistics were computed setting the lag truncation parameter equal to 3 (for details see Kwiatkowski
et. al. 1992). As the table shows, the null hypothesis that the series are 1(0) can be rejected in every case.
By contrast, the bottom line of the table indicates that stationarity of the first-differenced series cannot be
rejected at the 5 percent level, although the test statistics reveal some mild evidence that the first-
difference of  kg may be non-stationary.
To summarize, the univariate tests agree that z, crpr and Pk  are all l(l),  and provide reasonable
evidence in favor of  kpr being 1(1) as well. For kg the situation is somewhat less clear, since the two
tests provide some conflicting evidence. Nevertheless, as a working hypothesis, for the analysis below kg
is also  assumed to be I(]).
The next step is to investigate whether the series are cointegrated, so that a well-defined long-run
relationship exists among them. Table 5 reports the results of Johansen's  likelihood ratio cointegration
tests. They are based on a vector autoregression including two lags of each of the five variables in (1 1);
while use of longer lags might in principle be necessary to capture the full dynamics of the slow-moving
capital stocks, they result in severe depletion of the available degrees of freedom. A linear trend was also14
included to provide a crude representation of the effects of labor force growth and technical progress on
the capital stock, but was restricted to the cointegrating space since, as Table 4 showed, the first-
differenced variables do not appear to display trends.
Because likelihood ratio tests of cointegration suffer from considerable small-sample bias (which
typically results in their finding cointegration 'too  often'), it is essential that the critical values be
adjusted for sample size. Thus, the critical values presented in Table 5 were computed as indicated by
Cheung and Lai (1993). In the present case, this results in an upward revision of the asymptotic critical
values by roughly 46 percent. 16
The first column of Table 5 lists the number of cointegrating vectors (R) under the null hypothesis.
From the second and third columns, the hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at the 5 percent
level, in favor of at most one cointegrating vector, without much evidence of more than one.
4.3 Estimation  of the conditional model
Rather than pursuing the estimation of the full reduced-form VAR system, we tum to the estimation
of a structural model of kpr,  conditional on the other variables. 1 7 Since Table 5 suggests that there is only
one cointegrating relation in the full system, a single-equation structural model is sufficient to estimate
the parameters of the long-run relation (11). Thus the structural model is of the form:
p-I
Akpr, = BOAw, +  [  F  Akpr,j  + B  Aw,_j  X(kpr,,_  -P'w, 1 )+  ,  (12)
j=1
and is complemented with the reduced-form model of the conditioning variables:
Aw, =C0AW,+E  [AjAkpr,-,  CjAW-j]-  A (kpr,,-l-  'W,I)+lb  (13)
j=1
where w = (kg, z, crpr,  pd'  is the vector of conditioning variables; aj and x are parameters, and Aj 4P,  B  ,
C, and A are parameter vectors; E  and rj are random disturbances, and the term in round brackets in the
16 Asymptotic  critical  values  were taken from Osterwald-Lenum  (1992).  Their (inappropriate)  use in this small-
sample  context  would  lead to finding  four cointegrating  vectors.
17 Here and in the rest of this section  the term 'structural  model' is used in the simultaneous-equation  sense  that the
equation  of interest  (12) includes  the current  values  of more  than one variable.15
right-hand side of (12) and (13) represents the long-run equilibrium relationship, given by equation (I 1)
above.
From the results of  Johansen (1992) and Boswijk (1995), it follows that OLS in (12) alone provides
a super-consistent  estimator of the long-run coefficient vector j3  and the speed of adjustment X.
However,  other properties of the OLS estimator of the long-run parameters, such as its efficiency and
asymptotic distribution, as well as the properties of the estimator of the short-run parameters in (12),
depend critically on whether the conditioning variables w are (weakly) exogenous, an issue that will be
taken up later.
Leaving this question aside for the time being, the starting point for the conditional analysis is an
unrestricted autoregressive-distributed lag specification'8 for kpr, including the current and two lagged
values of the conditioning variables, plus the linear time trend. The OLS estimation results appear in
Table 6. While the equation is clearly overparameterized, and individual coefficients are in some cases
estimated imprecisely, the long-run solution is well-determined. It is of the form:
kpr = constant  + 0.045  time  - 0.839  kg + 0. 659 z  + 0.162 crpr - 0.213 Pk  (14)
Thus, the estimates indicate that public infrastructure capital has a positive long-run effect on the
private capital stock, while non-infrastructure capital has the opposite impact. Further, the estimated
magnitude of these effects is numerically quite large (recall that, with all the variables in log form, the
coefficients in (14) can be interpreted as elasticities). In addition, real credit to the private sector also
affects the private capital stock positively, while the relative price of capital has the expected negative
effect.
The bottom half of Table 6 reports a battery of diagnostic tests that reveal no signs of
misspecification. According to the test statistics, the residuals show no traces of autocorrelation or auto-
regressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH), and Ramsey's RESET test detects no functional form
misspecification. At most, the Jarque-Bera statistic provides some mild suggestion of non-normality of
the residuals.
The unrestricted equation in Table 6 can be re-arranged and simplified to arrive at an error-correction
specification describing both the dynamics of the capital stock and its long-run determinants, along the
lines of equation (13) above. This leads to the following model (standard errors in brackets):
18 This is what Hendry  (1995) labels  the "GUM"  (General  Unrestricted  Model)  specification.16
Akpr=  2.454  +k0.322Akpr,  - 0.414  A kgt  - 0.258  (Az  + A  z,tq)/2  +  0.054  A crpr,t  - 0.076Apk
(0.592)  (0.134)  (0.104)  (0.157)  (0.020)  (0.034)
-0.340  [ kt-l  - {0.044  time  - 0.948  kg,1.q  + 0.769  z,l  + 0.192  crpr,,_1  - 0.2 53 Pk,-I  }]  (15)
(0.072)  (0.012)  (0.288)  (0.236)  (0.068)  (0.110)
R'  = 0.893  SEE = 0.41%  Sample:  1962/63-1993/94
The simplifications introduced in equation (15) relative to the GUM model of Table 6 are easily
accepted by the data (F(4, 16) = 0.409, with a p-level of 0.800). The term in curly brackets in the second
line of the equation is the model's  long-run solution for the private capital stock, very similar to (14)
above' 9, and again indicating a strong favorable (adverse) effect of public infrastructure (non-
infrastructure) capital on the private capital stock. In terms of the model of section 3, the implication is
that the final goods produced by the private and public sector were, on the whole, relatively close
substitutes.
In turn, the short-run coefficients in the top line of (15) show that public non-infrastructure
investment also crowds-out private investment in the short run. Perhaps more interestingly, the short-run
estimates also provide some mild evidence that even infrastructure investment has an adverse short-run
impact on private investment; in fact, the estimates indicate that the effect of public infrastructure
investment on private capital accumulation only becomes positive after a two-year lag. The adverse
short-run impact could arise from the pressure of public investment programs on input markets -- a
channel that was omitted from the model in section 3, where capital accumulation was assumed to
require no labor.
Table 7 presents misspecification tests for equation (15). As before, they reveal no trace of residual
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, ARCH effects and non-normality, and the estimated equation appears
to forecast accurately. The estimated standard error is 0.41 percent, against a standard deviation of A kpr
of I percent, so that the model provides a fairly accurate account of the variation in the dependent
variable. Figure I plots the observed trajectory of the private capital stock and the fitted values from
(15), along with the corresponding residuals. As can be seen, the tracking is quite precise; however, there
is one large positive residual in 1990/91,  just equal to two standard errors. That year witnessed a private
investment boom (in fact, the peak of the dependent variable A kpr takes place in 1990/91, at over seven
times its standard deviation), which might have been due in part to investors'  anticipation of a tightening
19 Standard  errors  on the long-run  parameters  were computed  along the lines  described  in Bardsen  (1989).17
of import barriers on capital goods as a remedy to the impending macroeconomic crisis -- a measure that
took place effectively in 1991/92 -- and whose impact is not captured by the simple structural model
above.
An important issue is the stability of the estimated equation. This can be checked through recursive
estimation of its parameters, adding to the sample one observation at a time and verifying if the
equation's forecasts show large errors or the estimated parameters display instability, either of which
would suggest the existence of a structural break. Figure 2 presents the one-step ahead forecast errors
from 1974/75 onwards obtained from recursive estimation of the parameters of (15), along with their two
standard-error bands; forecast errors close or beyond those bands would indicate forecast failure and
possible instability of the estimated specification.  As the figure shows, prediction errors remain
throughout within their approximate 95 percent confidence region.
Recursive parameter estimates, along with their two standard error bands, appear in Figure 3. To
save space, only the long-run parameters are presented; however, the results for the remaining
parameters are similar. As can be seen, the estimates display very little variation relative to their ex-ante
standard errors, and their final (i.e., full-sample) 95 percent confidence intervals are contained in the
initial ones virtually in full, so that on the whole no indication of instability arises.
A more formal check on the constancy of the model is the test of parameter stability proposed by
Hansen (1992)20. However, the test is based on the assumption that the regressors are stationary, and
thus cannot be used to check the constancy of the parameters of the cointegrating vector, itself a linear
combination of l(l)  variables. The solution to this problem is to impose the values of the long-run
parameters and then test the constancy of the rest; this essentially amounts to testing the constancy of the
parameters describing the model's  dynamics -- including the speed of adjustment to the long-run
equilibrium.
Following this procedure with equation (15) leaves a total of seven parameters, plus the model's
estimated residual variance, whose stability is to be tested. Table 8 reports the individual tests on each of
them as well as the joint test of stability of all eight parameters. The approximate 5 percent critical value
for each individual test is 0.470, while that for the joint test is 2.1 1. As the table shows, all the computed
test statistics are well below critical levels, so that test reveals no sign of instability.
20 The test is based  on the cumulative  sums  of orthogonality  conditions  between  the regressors  and the least-squares
residuals  obtained  from estimating  the model  on the full sample.  If the model  is unstable,  the cumulative  sums
should differ significantly  from zero. The test statistic  has a non-standard  distribution,  but critical  values  are reported
by Hansen (1992).18
4.4 Testing weak exogeneity
The empirical analysis so far has been based only on the structural model given by (12) above,
ignoring the marginal model (13). The question arises of how the estimates thus obtained relate to those
that would have resulted from full-information estimation in the complete model. The answer is that in
general the properties of the OLS estimator obtained from the structural model alone -- i.e., its
consistency, as well as the validity of the standard errors and testing procedures reported in Table 6 and
equation (15) above -- depend crucially on whether the conditioning variables can be taken as weakly
exogenous for the parameters of interest.
The relevant notion of weak exogeneity depends on the particular choice of 'parameters of interest'.
If one is interested only in the long-run parameters of the structural model (i.e., the parameter vector 13
in (12), as well as the speed of adjustment A),  then the conditioning variables are weakly exogenous for
the parameters of interest if and only if the marginal model contains no cointegration; i.e., all the
elements of A  in (13) are equal to zero (Johansen 1992). In such case, the OLS estimator of  1 and A is
asymptotically efficient and normally distributed. This in turn means that the standard errors and testing
procedures on the long-run parameters reported above are indeed valid.
If, in addition, the parameters of interest include also those describing the structural model's
dynamics (i.e.,aj  and Bj in (12)), then to ensure weak exogeneity of the conditioning variables one must
add the requirement that the covariance between the disturbance in the structural model and those in the
marginal model be equal to zero (Urbain 1992). Under such additional assumption, the OLS estimator of
the short-run parameters is also consistent and asymptotically normally distributed.
These two requirements can be verified through standard variable-addition tests. As shown by
Johansen (1992), weak exogeneity for the long-run parameters can be checked by testing the significance
of the cointegrating vector(s) in a reduced-form regression of the conditioning variables on the past --
i.e., testing whether A  in (13) is equal to a vector of zeros. Likewise, weak exogeneity for all the
parameters in the structural equation can be checked by adding to it, as artificial regressors, the residuals
from the reduced-form regression just described, and then testing the joint nullity  of the coefficients of
these artificial regressors in the structural equation, and the coefficients on the cointegrating vector(s) in
the marginal equations (Boswijk and Urbain, 1994).
These weak exogeneity tests are reported in Table 9. The first two columns report the tests of weak
exogeneity for the long-run parameters only, while the third and fourth columns report the tests for the
entire set of parameters in the structural equation. In each case, the table presents the individual tests for19
each conditioning  variable  as well as the joint test for all four of them. The statistics  are in all cases
asymptotically  distributed  as X2,  with degrees  of freedom  equal  to the number  of exclusion  restrictions
being  tested (see the notes  to Table 9). As can be seen, the tests provide  very little evidence  against  weak
exogeneity,  which can be easily accepted  in every individual  as well as joint test. The conclusion  is that
the partial  model given  by equation  (12) contains  all relevant  information  about  the parameters
describing  both the long-run  capital stock as well as its short-run  dynamics,  and therefore  the estimates,
standard  errors and inferences  reported in the preceding  subsection  are indeed  valid.
A final check on the overall dynamic  specification  of the estimated  equation is provided  by a test
proposed  by Boswijk  (1994),  which checks  for the presence  of unstable  roots in the structural  model. The
test essentially  amounts  to examining  the significance  of the error-correction  term in the structural
equation;  if it is sufficiently  significant,  the presence  of unstable  roots can be rejected.  If, in addition,  the
conditioning  variables  are weakly  exogenous  (as appears  to be the case here),  the test is in fact a test of
the null hypothesis  of no cointegration.  While  the test statistic  does not have a standard  distribution,
asymptotic  critical values  have been  tabulated  by Boswijk  (1994).  For the specification  in equation  (I 5)
above,  the computed  test statistic  was 40.80  well beyond  the I percent critical value of 28.51,  thus
overwhelmingly  rejecting  the hypothesis  of no cointegration.
To summarize,  the estimation  results reported  in this section  are, on the whole, rather supportive  of
the analytical  specification  in section  3. They  provide strong  evidence  that in the long run public
infrastructure  capital crowds-in  private capital,  while  other types of public capital  have the opposite
effect. Real credit and the relative  price of capital goods  have  the expected  effects on the private capital
stock -- positive in the case of the former  and negative  for the latter.  However,  the favorable  impact  of
public  infrastructure  investment  on private  capital accumulation  takes two years to begin to materialize.
The empirical  specification  passes  a battery of diagnostic  tests, shows no sign of instability,  and
seems to provide  an accurate  description  of the trajectory  of the private capital  stock. Further,  the
exogeneity  tests clearly indicate  that the partial-model  approach  adopted  here is sufficient  to capture all
the relevant  empirical information  on the parameters  describing  the trajectory  of the private  capital stock.
5 - Concluding  remarks
While the relationship  between  public  and private investment  is a long-standing  issue in
macroeconomics  and development  economics,  few of the empirical  studies  addressing  it draw  the
distinction  between  public infrastructure  and non-infrastructure  capital.  This paper  has argued  that such
distinction  is essential in economies  in which  the state is actively involved  in production,  because  public20
investment  may play a dual role: public infrastructure  projects  raise the profitability  of private
production  and encourage  private investment,  while  non-infrastructure  projects  in areas  where the public
sector  competes  with private  firms may have  the opposite  effect. The paper has sketched  an analytical
model highlighting  these  opposing  effects  of public  capital.
The model is implemented  empirically  using investment  data for India,  which provides  a good
example  of the dual role of public investment.  The state-led  development  strategy  adopted  by India since
the late 1950s  resulted  in an expansion  of the public sector  into virtually  all spheres  of economic  activity.
While basic infrastructure  industries  were legally  reserved  to the state, in others public firms competed
with the private sector for productive  inputs,  customers,  and investment  licenses.
The empirical  implementation  follows a cointegration  approach  and makes use of a partial structural
model  of the private  capital stock, that has important  advantages  in terms  of transparency  and tractability
over the full-system  reduced-form  analysis,  particularly  in small-sample  context like the present  one. A
battery  of weak exogeneity  tests shows  that this simplified  procedure  entails  no loss of information  for
the purpose  of estimating  the parameters  describing  the trajectory  of private  capital.
On the whole,  the empirical  results  are quite supportive  of the analytical  model. The data provide
convincing  evidence  of a positive  and significant  long-run  effect of public infrastructure  capital  on the
private capital  stock, and an adverse  effect of public non-infrastructure  capital,  after controlling  for the
effects of capital  goods prices  and real credit availability  to the private sector.  In the analytical
framework  outlined in this paper,  this suggests  that the goods  supplied  by public non-infrastructure
enterprises  and private firms likely  were, on the wliole,  relatively  close substitutes.  The estimated
model's dynamics  also reveal that the adverse  effect of public  non-infrastructure  investment  on private
capital accumulation  operate  quite rapidly,  while the favorable  impact  of public infrastructure  investment
only arises after a two-year  lag. The  estimated  equation  has high explanatory  power, passes  a battery  of
diagnostic  tests, and the parameter  estimates  appear  constant  over the sample  period.
Since  the early 1990s,  India's economic  policies  have experienced  a substantial  change.  An effort --
still incomplete  -- at fiscal adjustment  has been  accompanied  by a shift towards  a market-oriented
development  model led by the private sector  -- a change  propitiated  by the large fiscal imbalances  of the
late 1980s  that resulted  from the overexpansion  of the public sector.  The paper's results indicate  that, to
have a maximum  impact  on private investment,  the ongoing fiscal  retrenchment  should be matched  by a
radical  redefinition  of public investment  priorities  in favor of infrastructure  projects.
One final clarification  may be in order.  While the results in this paper  underscore  the favorable
impact  of infrastructure  investment  on private capital  accumulation,  there is obviously  no reason  why21
infrastructure  services  should be necessarily  provided  by the public sector.  This has traditionally  been  the
case in many countries  (and certainly  in India, where infrastructure  industries  were for many  years off-
limits for the private sector),  but under an adequate  regulatory  framework  those services,  with the
associated  crowding-in  effects,  could  be likewise  provided  by private firms. In fact, India, like other
developing  countries  (notably  those in Latin America),  has recently  started  taking steps in that direction.22
Appendix:  data
The basic source are the Central Statistical Office's National Accounts, except for credit to the
private sector, which was taken from the Report on Currency and Finance published by the Reserve Bank
of India. The details are as follows.
Private capital stock: constructed on the basis of real net fixed investment by the private sector,
making use of the March 1981 capital stock figures reported by Central Statistical Office (1992). While
the 1994 National Accounts report capital stock estimates for the private sector for 1980/81-91/92, the
figures are not consistent with the net investment data (the inconsistency corresponds to the household
subsector), and therefore were not used.
Public infrastructure capital stock: sum of the real fixed capital stocks of the public sector in power,
water and sewage, and transport and communications. From 1980/81 on, the figures are taken directly
from the National Accounts. Prior to that year, public capital stock data are not available. However, the
older National Accounts (base 1970/71, extended back to 1960/61) report real investment data at a
comparable level of sectoral disaggregation. Thus, the disaggregated public capital stock series were
extended applying to this sectoral investment data the same average depreciation rates of the more
recent period; average depreciation rates were employed for each sector of use because the detailed asset
structure of sectoral investment is not available.
Public non-infrastructure capital stock: defined as the real fixed capital stock of the public sector,
taken directly from the National Accounts, minus the public infrastructure capital stock defined above.
Relative price of capital goods: defined as the deflator of real fixed investment of the private sector
divided by the deflator of real private GDP, both taken from the National Accounts.
Real credit to the private sector: defined as the stock of credit from the banking system to the
commercial sector, divided by the deflator of real private GDP.23
Table 1
India: Real Gross Fixed Investment
(percent of real GDP)
1960/61-69/70  1970/71-79/80  1980/81-84/85  1985/86-89/90  [  1990/91-94/95
Aggregate  Investment  17.46  17.70  18.98  19.84  J  20.72
Public Investment  7.88  7.62  9.45  9.49  8.18
Government  1.96  1.88  2.17  1.93  1.57 i
Enterprises  5.91  5.74  7.28  7.56  6.66 a/
Private Inmvestment  9.58  10.08  9.53  10.35  12.54
Households  7.22  8.39  5.99  6.71  6.13
Corporations  2.36  1.68  3.54  3.64  6.41
Note:  a11990/91  to 1993/94
Source:  Central Statistical Office and own calculations.24
Table 2
India: Public Sector Real Gross Domestic Investment
(percent of real GDP)
1960/61-69/70  1970/71-79/80  1980/81-84/85  1985/86-89/90  1990/91-92/93
Agriculture  0.88  1.03  1.23  0.77  0.54
Electricity, water and  1.36  1.66  2.31  2.62  2.50
g as__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Transport and  1.72  1.36  1.31  1.36  1.34
communications
Public administration  1.39  1.38  1.57  1.40  1.17
and defense
Other a/  2.25  3.31  3.64  3.52  3.36
TOTAL  7.60  8.74  10.06  9.67  8.89
Notes: -/ Includes manufacturing, mining, construction, trade and finance.
Source: Central Statistical Office and own calculations.25
Table 3
Public investment in transport and communications
(percent of GDP, 1981-1990)
Average of 31 LDCs  2.2
of which:
Low income  1.9
Middle income  2.4
India  1.3
Source: own calculations using data from
Easterly and Rebelo (1993).26
Table  4
Statignarity tests
(a) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics A
Null hy,pgXsis
kpr  kg  z  crpr  Pk
I (1)  -0.392  -1.027  -0.469  -1.089  -0.745
1 (2)  -2.815*  -3.986**  -4.733**  -3.321**  -3.627**
(b) Kwiatkiowski-Phillips -Schmidt-Shin test statistics  /
NWI hypes
kpr  kg  z  crpr  Pk
I (0)  0.561**  0.546**  0.551**  0.529**  0.488**
1 (1)  0.125  0.415*  0.302  0.196  0.294
Notes: W/  Third-order ADF test statistics
k2  Computed setting the lag truncation parameter equal to 3.
*  Significant at the 10 percent level.
**  Significant at the 5 percent level.27
Table  5
Maximum likelihood cointegration rank test statistics fl
Null hypothesis  Likelihood ratio  95% Critical value bl
R=O  128.4  127.9
R￿1  86.9  92.3
Rs2  56.9  62.2
Rs3  29.6  37.1
Rs4  7.5  11.0
Notes: a/  Derived from a vector autoregression with two lags of each variable, and
including also a linear trend in the cointegration space.
hb Adjusted for small-sample bias, following Cheung and Lai (1993).28
Table 6
Autoregressive distributed lag representation for kpr
(standard errors in brackets)
Variable  Lag  Sum
0  1  2
kpr  -1  0.980  -0.347  -0.367
(-)  (0.213)  (0.161)  (0.089)
kg  -0.328  -0.121  0.142  -0.308
(0.138)  (0.202)  (0.111)  (0.117)
z  -0.151  0.292  0.100  0.242
(0.144)  (0.209)  (0.175)  (0.103)
crpr  0.039  0.014  0.006  0.059
(0.025)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.030)
Pk  -0.059  -0.025  0.006  -0.078
(0.036)  (0.040)  (0.034)  (0.055)
time  0.017  0.017
(0.004)  (0.004)
constant  2.678  2.678
(0.692)  (0.692)
R  = 0.999  SEE = 0.44%  Sample: 1962/63-1993/94
Misspecification tests
Alternative hypothesis  Null distribution  Statistic  p-value
Istorderautocorrelation  F(1,  15)  0.034  0.813
2nd order autocorrelation  F (2, 14)  0.159  0.857
ARCH  F (1, 14)  0.051  0.822
Non-normality  X (2)  3.851  0.146
Functional misspecification  F (1, 15)  0.015  0.904
(RESET)29
Table 7
Misspecification tests for equation (15)
Alternative hypothesis  Null distribution  Statistic  p-value
1st order autocorrelation  F (1, 19)  0.064  0.802
2nd order autocorrelation  F (2, 18)  0.229  0.798
ARCH  F (1, 18)  0.521  0.476
Heteroskedasticity  F (11, 9)  0.474  0.928
Non-normality  2  2.223  0.329 X(2)2220.9
Functional misspecification  F (1, 19)  0.977  0.335
(RESET)30
Table  8
Tests of parameter instability
Coefficient on:  Statistic
Constant  0.048
Akpr, t-l  0.038
Akg, t  0.049
(Azt + Aztl)/2  0.046
Acrpr  0.082
APk  0.106
Error-correction term  0.048
Residual variance  0.145
Joint test  0.661
Note:  The 5% critical value for the tests on the
individual coefficients and the residual variance
is 0.470.  For the joint test it is 2.11 (see
Hansen 1992).31
Table  9
Tests of weak exogeneity
Test of exogeneity of:  For long-run parameters only/  For both short and long-runk/
Statistic  p-value  Statistic  p-value
kg  0.242  0.623  1.699  0.428
z  0.508  0.476  0.509  0.775
crpr  0.305  0.581  0.647  0.724
Pk  0.025  0.875  0.554  0.758
kg, z, crpr and  Pk  1.545  0.819  3.365  0.909
Notes:  a/  The statistics for the individual tests are distributed as x2 (1); the statistic for the
2 joint test, as X (4).
I  The statistics for the individual tests are distributed as x2 (2); the statistic for the
2 joint test, as X  (8).32
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Figure  3
Recursive OLS estimates of the long-run parameters of equation (1  5)
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